AAP2010 Abstracts


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Title Dr.
First Name Derek
Surname Baker
Institution Lingnan University, Hong Kong
Title of Paper Knowing Yourself, and Giving Up on Your Own Agency in the Process
Select a Stream Normative Ethics
Abstract People should avoid situations which will tempt them into acting wrongly. This principle seems obvious, but it is inconsistent with our picture of human responsibility. To illustrate, consider Michael Smith’s variation on the angry tennis-player. The tennis player loses. Normally the right thing to do is shake hands with one’s opponent. But this tennis player is enraged by his defeat. If he gets close to his opponent, he will smash him in the face. Smith thinks he should walk away, even though a more virtuous person would shake hands. That his anger would lead to disaster gives a decisive reason not to shake hands. But here’s the problem, the more virtuous person would shake hands because failing to do so is rude. It is bizarre to think that this tennis player is justified in acting rudely, because he’s a belligerent ape, while his more virtuous counterpart would be unjustified in acting rudely. We seem committed to the following, inconsistent principles. 1. A psychological disposition which will lead you to perform a morally wrong action in certain situations can change what you have most moral reason to do, even if the disposition not undermine your freedom. 2. If you have most moral reason to X, you are morally justified in Xing; if you have most moral reason to X, Xing is a morally right action. 3. That you will freely choose to commit a moral wrong in certain situations cannot justify (or make right) and otherwise unjustified (or morally wrong) action. I argue that giving up on any of these three principles has absurd consequences. So resolving this paradox will require adopting a seriously revisionary picture of human agency. Some vital piece of common-sense will have to be abandoned.